outcomes without incurring severe macroeconomic costs. As a consequence, much of the macroeconomic literature moved away from class-based, political economy models of inflation and unemployment towards what Iversen and Soskice 2006 elegantly call macroeconomics which ".. [F] ocuses attention on what democratic governments can do wrong in the short term". The prescription that followed was to replace government with independent central banks, and discretionary macroeconomic policy with rules based approaches such as inflation targeting (Barro and Gordon 1983, Cukierman 1992) .
While Post-Keynesian and heterodox approaches never abandoned the idea of demand management, the advent of New Keynesian economics restored the space in mainstream economics for economic policy to have beneficial macroeconomic outcomes. As opposed to rational expectations, there is a role for demand management and other policies when imperfections arise due to wage and price rigidities whereby involuntary unemployment can be reduced. The now long literature on the NAIRU continues to suggest that combating inflation and unemployment involves two independent and potentially opposing targets 5 .
Given that there has been a restitution of space for macroeconomic policy, this paper seeks to make a contribution in reconstructing the distributional consequences of antiinflationary and anti-unemployment policies, and attitudes towards them. Recent research on the impact of such policies on the poor and the rich has used social survey data to answer part of this question. Scheve 2004 and Jayadev 2006 both find strong results that the relatively poor are less likely than the relatively rich to prioritize tackling inflation as opposed to tackling unemployment, presumably because they take the latter to be a more important problem facing them.
This paper continues this line or research by assessing the class content of disinflationary and expansionary policy. Analyzing individual level observations from a unique cross country social survey data, I find support for the contention that those in contrary class positions respond very differently to policies engineered to combat inflation versus those that are designed to combat unemployment., I verify the fact that there are substantial class based differences in what may be termed 'relative aversion' to inflation and unemployment (a preference that policy is designed to keep inflation down rather than unemployment down). Capitalists and highly skilled workers are more likely to display relative inflation aversion than less skilled and unskilled workers. I then briefly extend the analysis to look at the relationship between relative inflation aversion and other attitudes towards macroeconomic policy. I find that individuals who support broadly pro-labor, solidaristic and redistributionary policies for the government are significantly less relatively inflation averse (or what is the same thing, more relatively unemployment averse). As such, the paper provides some indication for the degree and kind of political support that can be drawn for policies that aim to combat inflation versus those which combat unemployment. The results have implications for the debate on anti-inflationary policies and inflation targeting in particular as they apply to different countries.
In what follows, I very briefly summarize relevant research in the class impacts of inflation and unemployment and attitudes towards these problems in section (II). Section (III) describes the data that I use. Section (IV) presents the results of various logistic regressions. Section (V) summarizes and concludes.
Section (II): Class and attitudes towards inflation and unemployment
The radical political economy approaches to macroeconomics saw unemployment as acting as 'a regulator of class conflict' (Rowthorn 1977) . Unemployment was the central fulcrum of the labor-capital confrontation. Specifically, increases in unemployment maintained a downward pressure on wages while tight labor markets increased factor income going to labor by exerting upward pressure on wages (Boddy and Crotty 1975) 6 .
Conflict theories of inflation suggested that the rise in inflation was seen as the result of perpetual claims by workers for wage increases ahead of productivity . The detrimental impact of inflation was primarily on those who had nominally denominated assets whose value was eroded with increasing prices, although there were also pressures on firms which were unable to pass on higher wages as higher prices. To that extent the negative impact of inflation was more pronounced on the capitalist and rentier class. As a result these theories would predict pronounced differences in attitudes towards inflation and unemployment depending on the respondent's class position.
Drawing from this political economy research, empirical studies in the 1970s and 1980s had begun to establish the class character of individuals' preferences for inflation versus unemployment aversion. Given objective evidence that periods of relatively low unemployment and relatively high inflation coincided with an equalization of the personal distribution of income, a larger share of national income going to labor versus capital and a reduction in poverty as well as losses to those with savings in nominally denominated assets (typically the rich), attitudes towards inflation and unemployment had a class character. (2003) find that the low unemployment period in the American economy of the late 1990s aided in improving the welfare of workers according to several metrics. Real wages increased after a generation of decline, and the inflation adjusted income of low income families grew by twice the amount that they did in the eighties expansion ( when average unemployment was higher). Abraham and Haltiwanger 1995 who review mainly US evidence suggest that real wages are more likely to be pro-cyclical than counter-cyclical.
Recent studies of attitudes towards inflation and unemployment have largely ignored class. While there is substantial empirical evidence from opinion research that both inflation and unemployment are seen by respondents as disutilities (see, among others, Di Tella et al 2001 , Easterly and Fischer 2001 and Shiller 1997 , there is less consensus on the relative importance that individuals in different classes place on reducing each of these. Part of the issue is simply that there have been few surveys done which explicitly ask the respondent to rate their aversion to inflation versus unemployment if these were alternative outcomes. As such, the data has limited researchers' agenda. Equally, there has been little interest in the characteristics of individuals who might support a policy designed to combat inflation versus one that tackled unemployment. To the extent that this has been undertaken, it has been to assess inflation aversion among the rich versus the poor (Jayadev 2006, Easterly and Fischer 2001) 7 . There has been little to no recent work which attempts to look at politics and in particular class politics in the determination of preferences towards anti-inflation and anti-unemployment policy. It is to this exercise that we now turn.
Section (III): Data

Measuring Inflation Aversion
The International Social Survey Program (ISSP) conducted by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research in 1996 focuses on the preferences of more than 30,000 individuals in twenty-seven 8 different countries regarding the role of government in society. The countries included include OECD economies, former eastern bloc economies and unfortunately do not include any low income countries apart from China 9 . Among the questions asked in this survey is the following:
If the government had to choose between keeping down inflation and keeping down unemployment to which do you think it should give highest priority?
This is the key variable of analysis for the rest of the paper. I define a variable 'relative inflation aversion' as taking a value of one when the respondent prefers that the government prioritize reducing inflation rather than unemployment and zero when the opposite holds.
While this provides a direct measure of the weights placed in an individual welfare function on inflation as opposed to unemployment, it is not without some limitations.
Ideally, such a question might ask how much inflation the individual might accept for reducing the level of unemployment and vice versa so as to have a more direct calibration of the marginal rate of substitution in the social and individual welfare function. However, the measure is certainly superior to questions which ask about inflation without reference to unemployment or any other macroeconomic policy objective, thereby providing no implicit budget constraint. Figure 1 summarizes the average preference for keeping inflation rather than unemployment down by country.
Some interesting observations suggest themselves. Nearly 42 % of the overall sample report being relatively inflation averse. However, this masks large differences in the average relative inflation aversion between countries, from a low of less than 20% of respondents in France to a high of above 60% of respondents in the Czech Republic. In only five countries out of twenty is the percentage of relatively inflation averse respondents over half (and only in two countries--West Germany and the Czech Republic--is the percentage overwhelmingly above the midway mark).
Measuring Class
Constructing readily comparable and objective measures of social class are fraught with difficulties (See Leiulfsrud et al 2005 and Wright 1997 for an exposition on some of these).Contemporary measures of class differ based on the elements that researchers consider important to their theoretical approach--for example along lines of ownership, management, career prospects, income, status, education or other such categories (Carchedi 1978 , Wright 1985 , Esping-Andersen 1993 , Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1993 . However, not all of these are likely to bear directly upon the question of relative inflation aversion. Class has relevance in as much as it reflects the labor market position of the respondent and therefore his preferences to policies which enhances his or her position. It is desirable therefore to utilize a definition which closely reflects the respondent's occupation and position as employer or worker.
In this paper, I utilize a few different measures of class. The ISSP dataset provides an occupational variable based on the ISCO 1988 classification which has previously been used by researchers to construct a wide array of measures of stratification. A first (crude) method is to utilize the traditional Marxist division between firm owner and employee. If the respondent is classified as self-employed with employees, he or she is classified as a firm owner, and an employee otherwise. I define a dummy variable called firm owner which takes the value of 1 if the respondent is self employed and has more than one employee, and 0 otherwise.
Sociologists have expended enormous effort in providing more useful and sophisticated categorizations of class. In order to perform a more satisfactory class analysis, I replicate Wright's (1985) scheme which divides the labor force into owners and wage laborers and wage laborers in turn into three categories-experts, skilled and low-skilled. Wright uses this to operationalize his idea of class locations and contradictions therein. Workers may be divided according to their relative privilege in the labor process. Based on a careful cataloging of occupations, Wright defines experts as those whose jobs require skills (and in particular accredited or credentialed skills) and who are in scarce supply relative to their demand by the market. Semi-skilled and unskilled class positions by contrast are held by those who have uncredentialed or no skills and who are thus in abundant supply. Using this approach has significant advantages. It makes theoretical sense for the question at hand to conceive of class measures which reflect the respondent's relationship to the labor market and therefore to his or her bargaining power and probability of continued employment. An expert for example, will typically enjoy a credential rent and be more likely to have both a higher level of bargaining power and a lower probability of being replaced than a low-skilled worker. He or she may therefore have opposing ideological and political interests based to other workers. At the same time both an unskilled worker and a skilled worker are more concerned about unemployment than a capitalist 10 . Appendix 1 details the creation of the class variables.
. Figure 2 shows the average relative inflation aversion in each country for each grouping of wage laborers. As is evident, in most countries, 'experts' are more relatively inflation averse than semi-skilled and unskilled workers 11 , as might be expected given the logic that more highly skilled workers enjoy greater bargaining power and a lower probability of unemployment than lower skilled workers, but are equally likely to see their wages eroded by inflation.
Another approach is to look at subjective evaluations of class categories. The ISSP dataset asks respondents their own evaluation of their social class (the categories are lower middle class/ upper working class, middle class, upper middle class and upper class). Unlike more objective measures, subjective perceptions of class probably depend on an amalgam of factors such as the respondent's education, status, income and gender as well as factors which are of direct relevance to the question of relative inflation aversion-the respondent's position and prospects in the labor market and the asset market. Nevertheless, it is useful to look at this as a check on the robustness of the earlier measure of class. I define three subjective class categories-the variable subjective lower class takes a value of 1 when the respondent identifies as being in the lower class or in the working class and 0 otherwise. Another variable subjective middle class takes a value of 1 if the respondent is from the lower middle class or middle class and 0 otherwise. Finally, the value of the variable subjective upper class takes a value of 1 when the respondent is from the upper middle or upper class.
Section (IV): Results and Extensions
In order to assess the class character of relative inflation aversion, I undertake a series of logistic regressions of relative inflation aversion on the respondent's class position. Tables (II) and (III) provide the detailed results of these exercises.
Columns (I)-(III) in table (I) are the results from performing the logistic regression on the three definitions of class without any controls. As is evident from column (I), firm owners are significantly more likely than workers to be relatively inflation averse (or less likely to be relatively unemployment averse). Column (II) uses the classification for wage laborers developed by Wright. The omitted dummy is expert workers and hence the results suggest that as compared to experts, both low-skilled and skilled workers display less relative inflation aversion suggests that in comparison with the omitted group. Similarly, in column (III) in comparison to those who consider themselves upper class, those who consider themselves middle and lower class are much less relatively inflation averse.
Columns (I)-(III) in table (II)
shows that these results persist in the presence of a variety of plausible controls, including dummies for income, gender, age, employment status and union membership. Column (I) shows that a firm owner is about a fourth more likely to prefer anti-inflation to anti-unemployment policies as a worker. Column (II) shows that relative to 'experts', semi-skilled are about eight-tenths and unskilled workers are about nine-tenths as likely to report supporting anti-inflation to anti-unemployment policies. The results in column (III) show that as compared to the subjective upper class, subjective lower classes display significantly less inflation aversion. A respondent who considers himself or herself as being part of the lower or lower middle class is about three fourths as likely as someone who is in the upper class to prefer that the government keep inflation down. A respondent in the middle or upper middle class is about eight-tenths as likely as someone in the upper middle or upper class to prefer that inflation be kept down rather than unemployment.
The results on the control variables are interesting to note. Income is controlled for using dummies for income quintiles which take a value of 1 if the respondent is in that quintile or 0 otherwise. The odds ratio on the income quintile dummies reiterate the findings of Jayadev, 2006 -the poor are less relatively inflation averse than the rich, with each income quintile below the richest (the omitted quintile) displaying monotonically increasing inflation aversion, although in the second regression not all odds ratios are significant. Not surprisingly, the unemployed are less likely than those who have employment to prefer that the government pursue a policy of keeping inflation down rather than unemployment in all the models. Gender matters: women report being less relatively inflation averse than men. Trade-union members display statistically significantly less relative inflation aversion than non-union members, perhaps because union members can more easily bargain their wages upwards than non-union members in the face of rising prices. Somewhat surprisingly, age does not appear to have a statistically significant impact on an individual's relative inflation aversion either when expressed simply or as a categorical variable. These general results are quite robust to a host of other controls for individual characteristics, including household size, whether the respondent is based in an urban area or not, marital status, whether the respondent is employed in the public sector or the private sector and so on.
What kinds of other policy preferences are associated with relative inflation aversion? If the class content narrative is correct and not simply an artifact of the occupational categorization used in this paper to define class, we should find that there are other attitudes in common with respect to class politics. To test this, I use questions from the ISSP dataset which speak to the respondent's stance towards pro-business and pro-labor policies and attitudes on the one hand and towards redistributionary policies on the other. The dataset provides a host of questions which could be used for the purpose and while those used here are not exhaustive, using other indicators provides very similar results.
In order to gauge attitudes towards labor and towards business I construct several dummy variables which could be said to represent anti-labor and pro-business sentiment. I define a dummy variable Pro Wage Control when the respondent replies being strongly in favor or in favor of wage control by law. Another dummy variable Anti Jobs for All refers to the situation when the respondent believes that it should not be the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one. If the respondent is against the idea of the government financing of new jobs then he or she is said to be Anti Government Jobs. The variable Pro Deregulation refers to the situation the respondent is for government deregulation of business. Anti Protect Jobs takes a value of 1 if the respondent is abgainst the protection of declining industries in order to protect jobs. Finally the dummy variables Power of Labor and Power of Business refer to situations where the respondent believes the political power of labor and the political power of business to be too strong respectively. Column (I) in table (IV) shows the results of a logistic regression of the inflation aversion variable on these dummies. In concordance with the narrative of class based differences, all the odds ratios are statistically significant and in the expected direction. There is a strong correspondence between pro business and anti labor preferences on the one hand and relative inflation aversion on the other.
Attitudes towards redistribution are approximated by three dummies. A respondent is Anti Redistribution if he or she responds that the government should not redistribute wealth, and is Anti Equalization if he or she responds that it is not the government's responsibility to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor. If the respondent prefers reducing taxes even if this means lower social services then the dummy variable Lower Social Services takes a value of 1. Column (II) in table (IV) shows the results of a logistic regression of the inflation aversion variable on these dummies. The odds ratios are all statistically significant and show that relative inflation aversion is stronger among respondents who are also against government action to redistribute income and wealth and to provide social services at the potential cost of higher taxation.
Section (V): Conclusion
In the last three decades, the hopeful message of Keynesian demand management has fallen out of favor with policy makers; as more faith has been placed in market based solutions, in independent central banks and in microeconomic interventions to handle the problems of inflation and unemployment. The theoretical impetus for this shift was provided by the rational expectations revolution of the 1970s and subsequent new classical analyses of the state. These in turn argued that democratic governments were often bad for macroeconomic efficiency as they would tend to increase deficits and be unable to credibly tackle inflationary pressures. Worse still, any attempt to artificially reduce the unemployment rate would lead inevitably to higher inflation with no effect beyond the very short term on the unemployment rate. Thus, the standard prescription of earlier times was replaced by the orthodoxy of central bank independence and, increasingly a narrow focus on inflation targeting (Bernanke et al 1999) . For proponents of this view, delegating responsibility to an authority which can credibly commit to a single target is beneficial in increasing macroeconomic efficiency and protecting the public from a perhaps well meaning, but misguided government.
A movement away from commitment to full employment and towards low targeted inflation has potentially profound distributional consequences. Despite the claims made by some that anti-inflationary policy is, for example, pro poor 12 , it is an empirical question as to whether inflation or unemployment is seen as a bigger problem by different individuals if there is a trade-off between these. Both inflation and unemployment are more likely for example to affect the poor, but recent research on inflation versus unemployment aversion (Jayadev 2006 , Scheve 2004 found that the rich are more relatively inflation averse than the poor. The results presented in this paper further strengthen this idea by finding that relative inflation aversion is more pronounced among the privileged or elite broadly defined in class terms. Since class is a critical variable in determining an individual's labor market opportunities as well as the source and variability of his or her income, the results make sense. The findings are in concordance with conflict based models of unemployment and inflation which argue that macroeconomic policies may have systematically differential effects on the welfare of workers and owners (as well as on different segments of the working class) and that the preferences of individuals in separate class positions reflect these differences. These findings have important consequences for research on the implications of anti-inflation versus anti-unemployment policies in general and on the more current debate around inflation targeting in particular. F r a n c e Notes: ***= significant at the 1% level, **= significant at the 5% level, *= significant at the 10% level.
Omitted variable is experts (high skilled) in column (II), and subjective upper class in column (III). Country average inflation dummies are included but not shown. Notes: ***= significant at the 1% level, **= significant at the 5% level, *= significant at the 10% level. Omitted variable are experts (high skilled) and highest income quintile in column (II), and subjective upper class and highest income quintile in column (III). Country average inflation dummies are included but not shown. Notes: ***= significant at the 1% level, **= significant at the 5% level, *= significant at the 10% level. Country average inflation dummies are included but not shown
